


^'" /i 





















\ » - 









V , A' 









ft >^ > X . • 




aass VSf^l^. 



i 



I 



9 ^ ^ 



d 



JAN 17 1903 
D. of 0, 



4 7^^-*^ £u^'^Xi^ ^^'-K 



HISTORY OF THE PHILIPPIC POLICY. 



Peefatory Note. — Prof. Theodore S. Woolsej^, in an article on 
''Our relations with China,'" printed April 28, 1900, recalled that — 

The importance of retaining the PhiUppines, when the treaty of peace with Spain 
was being negotiated, and later when its ratification was in question, was urged not 
only on account of their own fertility and resources, but also and particularly because 
their fortunate situation would aid this country in extending its trade with China. 

No one can understand the genesis of the Philippines acquisition by 
the United States who does not recall to mind the Chinese situation in 
the fall of 1897 and the winter of 1897-98. For, as Professor Woolsey 
has intimated, China furnished the chief motive for the McKinley 
Administration's Philippine polic3^ 

In his annual message to Congress, December 5, 1898, President 
McKinley said: 

The United States has not been an indifferent spectator of the extraordinary 
events transpiring in the Chinese Empire whereby portions of its maritime provinces 
are passing under the control of various European powers. 

Those events are worth recalling. On October 18, 1897, the news 
I was telegraphed over the world that the Russian fleet had entered Port 
Arthur with the intention of wintering there. In November, 1897, 
some German missionaries were murdered by Chinese in the province 
of Shantung, with the result that the German Government took forcible 
possession at once of Kiao Chou Bay, and then secured, by coercion of 
the Chinese Government, a ninety-nine years' lease of the same, and prac- 
tically established a protectorate over Shantung Province. The United 
States Government was oflicially informed by Minister Denb}^, in a 
dispatch dated March 29, 1898, that a convention had been signed 
between Russia and China by which Port Arthur and Talienwan were 
ceded to Russia under a lease; and earlier still, on March 9, 1898, the 
Government was informed by Minister Denby of the terms of the 
settlement between German}^ and China regarding Kiao Chou Bay. 

A disyjatch from Mr. Denby, dated April 5, 1898, stated that China 
had ceded Weihaiwei to Great Britain, and on April 20, 1898, Mr. 
Denby informed the Washington Government concerning the French 
occupation of Kwangchou Bay. All this information reached Wash- 
ington in ofiicial form before the outbreak of the Spanish war (see 
diplomatic correspondence concerning China in House Doc. No. 1, 
Fifty-lifth Congress, third session), but the main facts were in the 
newspapers and before the public, in their most important bearings 
upon the status of China, as early as the autumn of 1897 and the win- 
ter of 1897-98. The threatened partition of China was a conspicuous j 
topic of discussion during those months among publicists, statesmen, / 

3 / 



4 HISTORY OF THE PHILIPPINE POLICY. 

and diplomats. The commercial interests of the United Skates in China 
were repeatedly pointed out. The New York Tribune, on January- 1, 
181J8, said editorially: 

The United States, too, lias great interest in Cliina and hopes to have greater when 
the annexation of Hawaii andthe laying of the telegraphic cable shall have helped 
this country into the dominant rank in Pacitic connnerce to which it is naturally 
entitled. 

There was even talk of going to war to prevent China's dismember- 
ment hj protectionist powers. Senator Teller, of Colorado, in an inter- 
view January 3, 1898, said: 

It is our duty to prevent the dismemberment of China. "We should join with 
Great Britain in a notice to Russia and Germany that dismemberment will not be 
permitted. 

Thus the general oriental question was in the minds of the ruling- 
statesmen of America in the winter preceding the Spanish war. The 
Administration, as President McKinley said later on to Congress, was 
not an "indifferent spectator"" of the important events that took place 
on the coast of Asia. Meanwhile, our relations with Spain concerning 
Cuba concentrated public attention, and these relations were growing- 
more acute. In the same month, November, 1897, that German war- 
ships entered Kiao Chou Bay the Government at Washington had been 
pointedly reminded of the interesting relation that existed between the 
Chinese question and the Cuban question through Spain's sovereigntj^ 
in the Philippine Islands, an archipelago lying off the Chinese coast. 

On November 3, 1897, Consul-General Wildman, at Hongkong, called 
the attention of the Department of State to an offer of an alliance that 
had been made by Agoncillo, agent of the Filipino insurgent junta, the 
alliance to be between the Philippine republic and the United States 
in the event of a war between the United States and Spain. (See p. 
333, Senate Document No. 62, part 1, Fifty -fifth Congress, third ses- 
sion.) This offer was declined by the United States Government in a 
dispatch by Mr. Cridler to Consul-General Wildman, dated December 
15, 1897. The coyrewpondence is important as showing that some five 
months, at least, before the outlu-eak of war with Spain our Govern- 
ment realized the delicate situation in the Philippines, and was also 
considering Philippine affairs at a time when the Chinese question was 
stii-ring the public mind of Europe, America, and Japan. It may also 
be asserted that the Washington Administration was at that early date 
also considering the possibilities of a military campaign in the Philip- 
pines, for in McClure's Magazine of October. 1899, Governor Roose- 
velt, who was Assistant Secretary of the Navy prior to the Spanish 
war, wrote as follows: 

It has been said that it was a mere ai'cident that Dewey happened to be in com- 
mand of the Asiatic Squadron when the war with Spain broke out. This is not the 
fact. He was sent to command it in the fall of 1S97 because, " to use the very lan- 
guage employed at the time, it was deemed wise to have there a man ' who could go- 
into Manila if necessary.' " 

Having sketched the background in the Far East as it appeared to 
the Administration in the autumn of 1897 and the winter of 1897-98, 
we may now review the successive steps in the actual development of 
the policy of conquest and territorial nc(]uisition in the Philippines. 

1. 

Explosion of tlie Mai/ic in Ilabana Harbor. Februarv 15, 1898. 



HISTORY OF THE PHILIP PITSTE POLICY. 5 

2. 

Assistant Secretary of the Navy Roosevelt, Secretary Long being 
absent from dntj, on February 25, 1898, sent a dispatch to Commodore 
Dewey, on the Asiatic Squadron, in which he said: 

Order the squadron, except Monocacy, to Hongkong. Keep full of coal. In the 
event of declaration of war with Spain your duty will be to see that the Spanish 
squadron does not leave the Asiatic coast, and then offensive operations in the 
Philippine Islands. 

[Note.— So far as is known this dispatch to Commodore Dewey, sent 
two months before tlie declaration of war, was the first sent by the 
United States Government with regard to a conquest of the Philippine 
Islands. Its historical importance is evident since it proves that an 
offensive campaign in the Archipelago was early planned to follow the 
destruction of the Spanish fleet.] 

3. 

Commodore Dewey, March 31, 1898, cabled from Hongkong to 
Washington : 

About 15,000 soldiers of all arms in all the islands, of which the majority are 
in the vicinity of Manila. The islands are now in a state of insurrection and my 
informants state that even Spanish soldiers, which constitute only a small part of 
the whole, are disaffected. Both ships and ports are in need of ammunition. I 
believe I am not overconfident in stating that with the squadron now at my 
command the vessels could be taken and the defenses of Manila reduced in one 
day. There is every reason to believe that with Manila taken, or even blockaded, 
the rest of the islands would fall either to the insurgents or ourselves, as they are 
only held through the support of the navy and are dependent upon Manila for sup- 
plies. Information has just reached me that there are 5,000 armed rebels in camp 
near Manila who are ready to assist us. 

[Note. — This dispatch shows that Commodore Dewey, several weeks 
before war began, was placing bright assurances before the Govern- 
ment at Wa^shington of a conquest of the archipelago that should take 
place after a naval battle. This dispatch is in harmony with the Feb- 
ruary instructions of the Government to the Commodore; it also fore- 
shadows cooperation with the Filipino insurgents against Spain. It 
is worth noting, too, that the Government, after the receipt of this 
dispatch, sent no word to Dewey cautioning him to limit his operations 
to establishing control of the sea. Meanwhile let us observe the 
course of the diplomatic correspondence between the Washington 
Government and its minister at Madrid, Gen. Stewart L. Woodford, 
bearing, at the same time, Dewey's dispatch of March 31 in mind. 
On that same day, March 31, Minister Woodford cabled to the Presi- 
dent: 

Spanish pride will not permit the ministry to propose and offer an armistice (to 
the Cuban insurgents) which they really desire. * * * The ministry have gone 
as far as they dare to-day. 

On April 3 Minister Woodford wrote to Washington: 

The Spanish minister for foreign affairs assures me that Spain will go as far and as 
fpst as she can. The Austrian ambassador * * * says that he will guarantee 
that Spain will do this. 

The diplomatic correspondence (House Document No. 1, Fifty -fifth 
Congress, third session) shows that the Spanish Government was 
moving as rapidly as possible to meet American demands reo-arding 
Cuba, and were delaying in the matter of the armistice in order not 



6 HI8T0EY OF THE PHILIPPINE POLICY. 

to outrun the movement of Spanish public opinion. Onl}' a few days, 
however, were required for Spain to meet the Washington Govern- 
ment regarding- the armistice which Secretary Day had suggested, 
and this was to he done in a way shrewdly calculated to gain the sup- 
port of a Catholic people like the Spaniards. On April 5 Minister 
Woodford cabled to the President: 

Should the Queen proclaim the following before 12 o'clock noon of Wednesdaj% 
April 6, will you sustain the Queen, and can you prevent hostile action by Con- 
gress ? 

"At the request of the Holy Father, in this Passion Week, and in the name of 
Christ, I proclaim immediate and unconditional suspension of hostilities in the island 
of Cuba. 

"This suspension is to become immediately effective so soon as accepted by the 
insurgents in that island, and is to continue for the space of six months, to the 5th 
day of October, 1898. 

"I do this to give time for passions to cease, and in the sincere hope and belief 
that during this suspension permanent and honorable peace may be obtained 
between the insular government and those of my subjects who are now in rebellion 
against the authority of Spain. I pray the blessing of heaven upon this truce of 
God, which I now declare in His name and with the sanction of the Holy Father of 
all Christendom." 

Please read this in the light of all my previous telegrams and letters. I believe 
that this means peace, which the sober judgment of our people will approve long 
before November, and which must be approved at the bar of history. 

The reply to Minister Woodford, sent that same night, was remark- 
ably cool and unresponsive, being as follows: 

The President highly appreciates the Queen's desire for peace. He can not assume 
to influence the action of the American Congress beyond the discharge of his con- 
stitutional duty in transmitting the whole matter to them with such recommenda- 
tions as he deems necessarj^ and expedient. * * * if armistice is offered by the 
Government of Spain the President M'ill communicate that fact to Congress. The 
President's message will go to Congress to-morrow. It will recount the conditions 
in Cuba. * * * He will not advise the recognition of the independence of the 
insurgents, but will recommend measures looking to the cessation of hostilities. 

The important point in this connection is that this virtual breaking 
ofl' of negotiations with Madrid for a peaceable solution of the Cuban 
problem (as was clearly ii^plied in the announcement to General Wood- 
ford that the President's war message would go to Congress the next 
da}^ despite Spain's effort to meet American demands regarding an 
armistice) folloAved Dewey's dispatch of March 31 painting brightly 
the prospects of an eas}^ conquest of the Philippines within five davs. 
The inference is that Dewe5"'s dispatch regarding the easv Philippine 
conquest had direct eii'ect upon Washington diplomacy and made 
strongly for war.] 

4. 

Meeting at Singapore between United States Consul-General Pratt 
and Emilio Aguinaldo, April 24, 1898. On the same day Mr. Pratt 
cabled to Dewe}^ at Hongkong: 

Aguinaldo, insurgent leader, here. Will come to Hongkong arrange Avith Commo- 
dore general cooperation insurgents Manila, if desired. Telegraph. 

On the same day Dewey answered: 

Tell Aguinaldo to come soon as possible. 

[Note. — In a cable to Secretarv Day, dated April 27. 1898. Consul- 
General Pratt said: 

General Aguinaldo gone my instance Hongkong arrange with Dewey cooperation 
insurgents Manila. 



HISTOEY OF THE PHILIPPHSTE POLICY. 7 

On April 28, the next da}^, Mr. Pratt wrote to Secretaiy Da}^: 

I think that m arranging for his [Aguinaldo's] direct cooperation with the com- 
mander of our forces I have prevented possible conflict of action and facilitated the 
work of occupying and administering the Philippines. 

Now, although Aguinaldo was in Hongkong as late as May lY, the 
Washington Government, already informed by Mr. Pratt of the new 
relations between Commodore Dewey and Aguinaldo, made no eflort 
to prevent the Filipino leader from being transported to Luzon on an 
American ship and under American auspices.] 



Cable from Secretary Long to Commodore Dewey, April 24, 1898: 

War has commenced between the United States and Spain. Proceed at once to 
Philippine Islands. Commence operations at once, particularly against the Spanish 
fleet. You must capture vessels or destroy. Use utmost endeavors. 

[Note. — This dispatch is notable in one respect. It implies that the 
" operations" to be begun are more comprehensive than the capture or 
destruction of the Spanish fleet. Thus it is in entire harmony with 
the instructions sent to Dewey February 25 and with Dewej'^'s con- 
ception of the conquest of the archipelago, after having fought the sea 
fight.] 

6. 

War with Spain officially declared April 26, 1898. 

7. 

Battle of Manila Bay, Ma}^ 1, 1898, in which Spanish sea power in 
the Orient is annihilated. 

8. 

General Miles, on Maj^ 3, 1898, immediately upon receiving the 
news of Dewej^'s naval victorj^, writes to the Secretarj^of War recom- 
mending that some 5,000 troops, under command of Gen. T. M, Ander- 
son, "be sent to occup}?" the Philippine Islands." On Ma}^^, 1898, the 
President approves General Miles's recommendation, as follows: 

Executive Mansion, May 4, 1S98. 
The troops designated by General Miles, if approved by the Secretary of War, 
should be assembled at San Francisco, Cal., for such service as may be ordered 
hereafter. 

William McKinley. 
9. 

On May 16, 1898, after seeing Conuuodore Dewey's dispatch of Ma}"" 
13, General Miles makes a second recommendation, increasing the size 
of the army to be sent to the Philippines, " in order to make the 
United States forces as strong and effective as possible, with a view to 
its maintaining our possession and our flag on the Philippine Islands." 

10. 

On May lY, 1898, Gen. Wesley Merritt, who had been appointed 
commander of the military force to be sent to the Philippines, writes 
to the War Department, protesting that the force to be given him is — 

Unsuited to the ends to be accomplished and insufiicient in efficiency * * * 
when the work to be done consists of conquering a territory 7,000 miles from our 



HISTORY OF THE PHILIPPINE POLICY. 

base, defended by a regularly trained and acclimated army of from 10,000 to 25,000 
men and inhabited by 14,000,000 peojole, the majority of whom will regard us with 
intense hatred born of race and religion. 

11. 

The President communicates his instructions to General Merritt on 
May 19, beginning as follows: 

The destruction of the Spanish fleet at Manila, * * * the paroling of the garri- 
sons, and acquisition of the control of the bay, have rendered it necessary * * * to 
send an army of occupation to the Philippines for the two fold purpose of com- 
pleting the reduction of the Spanish power in that quarter and of giving order and 
security to the islands while in the possession of the United States. 

[Note. — The foregoing letters and memoranda by Generals Miles 
and Merritt and the President are significant of this, namel}^, that 
when the news of Dewey's expected naval victory was received in 
Washington there was no hesitation whatever displayed, either by the 
General Commanding the Army or by the President himself, in pro- 
ceeding at once to the next step — the military occupation of the Philip- 
pines — which had been first distinctly foreshadowed in the February 
instructions to Dewe3^ It is evident also that General Merritt's ear- 
liest idea of his own work was that of a conquest. The President's 
own instructions to Merritt show that at that date, May 19, he did 
not regard Dewey's naval victory as effecting a conquest of the islands, 
for he describes Merritt's task as "completing the reduction of the 
Spanish power," which is a recognition of the fact that the Sivmj was 
necessary to destroj^ the Spanish power in the archipelago after the 
navy had done its work. 

Gen. R. A. Alger, Secretary of War during the Spanish-American 
war, says in his recently published book, on page 326: 

Although the determination to send an army of occupation to the Philippines was 
reached before Dewey's victory occurred, and orders for assembling volunteers at 
San Francisco with this object in view had been given as early as May 4, the news 
of the success of Manila Bay greatly hastened the preparations for this army. 

This statement proves conclusively that the design of sending an 

. army of conquest to the Philippines existed in the Administration 

V prior to Dewey's victory in Manila Bay, and it demolishes utterly the 

contention, which apologists for the Administration have made, that 

there was no thought of acquiring, conquering, or occup3'^ing the 

islands until the naval battle unexpectedly placed Manila in our power.] 

12. 

Aguinaldo lands at Cavite from theU. S. S. McCulloch, Maj 19, 1898. 

13. 

Aguinaldo issues proclamation to Filipinos, May !21:, 1898, prohibit- 
ing conduct by them contrary to the laws of war. 

14. 

Secretary Long cables to Dewej^ "not to have political alliances 
with the insurgents or any faction in the islands that would incur 
liability to maintain their cause in the future," Mav 26, 1898. 

[Note. — This dispatch is consistent with the original determination 
of the United States Government to effect a conquest of the Philip- 
pines, or some portion of them.] 



HISTOEY OF THE PHILIPPINE POLICY. \) 

15. 

Insurgents isolate Luzon from other islands as early as June 2, and 
on June 5 they form a circle around Manila, "thus effectually cutting 
us off from every means of relief." (Testimonj^ of Spanish General 
Jaudenes.) 

16. 

Aguinaldo issues proclamation organizing a military government, 
June 18, 1898. 

17. 

Aguinaldo issues proclamation establishing an independent revolu- 
tionary goA^ernment June 23, 1898, and on same day issues a message 
to foreign powers, including United States, announcing establishment 
of that government. 

18. 

First American troops, under General Anderson, land at Cavite, 
June 30, 1898. 

19. 

General Anderson, July 1, 1898, writes to Aguinaldo asking that 
"■your people cooperate with us in militarv operations against the 
Spanish forces." 

20. 

Filipino republic proclaimed July 3, 1898. 

[Note. — ^During this period the United States Government, while 
being fully informed, made no protest against the course of Aguinaldo 
in establishing and proclaiming to the world an independent republic] 

21, 

Captain Coghlan, commanding the Raleigh and Concord^ on July 7, 
1898, takes Grande Island, in Subig Bay, and turns the Spanish garrison 
over to Aguinaldo to be kept as prisoners of war. By this act 
Admiral Dewey treated Aguinaldo as a civilized combatant and also 
treated him as an allj'-, since the act in question took place after 
Aguinaldo's proclamation of the establishment of an independent 
native government. • 

22. 

Gen. Wesley Merritt, American commander in chief of the Philip- 
pine expedition, arrives at Cavite, July 25, 1898. 

[Note.— General Merritt refrained from the da3^of his arrival from 
direct relations with Aguinaldo, whose force had encircled the city and 
hemmed in the Spanish garrison. See General Merritt's official 
report, dated August 31, 1898, in which he says: 

As my instructions from the President fully contemplated the occupation of the 
islands by American land forces and stated that the powers of the military occupants 
are absolute and supreme and immediately operate upon the jDolitical condition of 
the inhabitants, I did not consider it wise to hold any direct communication with 
the insurgent leader mitil I should be in possession of the city of Manila. ] 



10 HISTOEY OF THE PHILIPPINE POLICY. 

23. 

Upon the request of the American generals Aguinaldo withdraws 
his forces from the sea beach and the "Callo Real" on Jul}^ 29, so that 
American troops under Greene could move against the city. 

24. 

Aguinaldo, August 6, issues an appeal to the foreign powers for the 
recognition of the belligerency and the independence of the Philippine 
revolutionary p'overnment. 



General Merritt and Rear- Admiral Dewey, on August 9, make a 
formal demand on Spanish general for the surrender of Manila, in 
which they point out to him that thecitj^ is '"' surrounded in all parts" 
" b}^ a constantly harassing force." 

[Note. — The phrase " surrounded in all parts" contained a reference 
to the insurgents, who held the Spaniards closely invested, except where, 
on request, thej had yielded their positions at one or two points to 
the American troops. This shows that the American commanders 
used the fact of the insurgents' military position to influence the Spanish 
general to surrender.] 

26. 

Peace protocol between Spain and the United States, signed at 
Washington August 12, 1898. 

• 27. 

After a mock assault upon the defenses of Manila by the American 
troops, which was prearranged with the Spaniards, the city of Manila 
was surrendered to General Merritt August 13. The insurgent troops 
were not permitted by p-eneral Merritt to enter the city. 

[Note. — The peace protocol provided that "the United States will 
occupy ajid hold the city, ba}^, and harbor of Manila pending the con- 
clusion of the treaty of peace which shall determine the control, dis- 
position, and government of the Philippines,"] 

There is nothing in that stipulation inconsistent with the assumption 
that a conquest of the Philippines, or some part of them, had been 
designed bj^ the Administration a considerable time before the war 
with Spain broke out. When Spain's appeal for terms of peace 
reached the President, July 26, General Merritt had reached Luzon 
only the da}^ before, and it was obvious that he could do no more than 
take the city of Manila within the next few weeks. For the Admin- 
istration to have declined to offer peace terms to Spain at that time 
would have been condemned b}' all the civilized world no less than by 
our own people. 

Although General Merritt had not taken Manila when the peace 
protocol negotiations were in progress, the Administration achieved 
its ulterior purposes by indirection, namely, b}^ the terminology of 
article 3 of the peace protocol, as quoted above. It secured the city 
of Manila b}^ negotiations even before Merritt captured it, and it also 
secured an advantage in the protocol — the relegation of the whole 
question of "the control, disposition, and government" of the Philip- 



HISTOBY OF THE PHILIPPINE POLICY. 11 

pines to the treaty commissioners at Paris — which advantage Merritt 
was not able to gain by the terms of the capitulation under which 
Manila was surrendered by General Jaudenes. As will be seen later on, 
the President, when the permanent treaty of peace was under negotia- 
tion at Paris, set up a claim to the whole Philippine Archipelago, by 
right of conquest, and personally urged it with extraordina r}^ persist- 
ency in private and public, although his treat}^ commissioners declined 
to accept his views, since they were not supported by international 
law. 

It is a curious, and perhaps significant, fact that as early as July 

1898, the Government of the United States thought it worth while to 
send a geologist and mineralogist to study the geology and mineral 
resources of the archipelago. See introduction b}^ George F. Becker 
to the Report on the Geology of the Philippine Islands, published 
b}^ the United States Geological Survey, Department of Interior. 
1901, in which he says, on page 8: 

In July, 1898, I was ordered to report to the military governor of the Philippines 
for duty as geologist, and I accompanied Gen. E. S. Otis to Manila. I remained in 
the Philippines fourteen months. 

It may be asked, of what use was a geologist in waging war? He 
had no military value. Yet when he was sent out to the Philippines 
the American army had not even occupied the city of Manila. Obvi- 
ously the geologist and mineralogist was sent out at that very early 
day to study the natural wealth of the islands, as his final report shows, 
and the step was entirely in harmony with the policj^ of territorial 
acquisition. Had there been no design of taking territor}^ in the 
Philippines as a result of the war, then it is difiicult to understand 
the reason for sending out a Government geologist.] 

28. 

Gen. E. S. Otis succeeds General Merritt in command, August 29, 

1898. 

29. 

Insurgents, in response to General Otis's demands, evacuate the 
suburbs of Manila, September 15, 1898. 

[Note. — There was controversy between General Otis and Aguinaldo 
as to the extent of the zone around Manila which the native forces 
should evacuate. (See General Otis's annual report of August 31, 

1899, pp. 19-22.) General Otis finally admitted that Aguinaldo's 
claim that Pandacan was be3^ond the ' ' suburbs " of Manila had been 
recognized by General Merritt. It followed that, under the Wash- 
ington protocol, the American forces had no right to occupy the dis- 
trict of Pandacan. Aguinaldo, however, being threatened with the 
forcible removal of his men by the American army, withdrew from 
the district of Pandacan on October 25, and General Otis's forces occu- 
pied it. The armed collision on the night of February 4 took place 
in that same district of Pandacan.] 

30. 

Filipino Congress meets at Malolos, September 16, 1898. 



12 HISTORY OF THE PHILIPPINE POLICY. 

31. 

President McKinley, on September 16, 1898, instructs the Amer- 
ican peace commissioners that "the United States can not accept less 
than the cession in full right and sovereignty of the island of Luzon" 
in the coming peace settlement at Paris. 

32. 

Peace commissioners of United States and Spain meet at Paris, 
October 1, 1898. 

33. 

The President, on October 20, instructs his peace commissioners at 
Paris to demand the cession by Spain to the United States of the whole 
Philippine Archipelago, 

34. 

The President, on October 28, directs his commissioners not to yield 
the position that the Philippines "can be justl}^ claimed by concjuest." 

33. 

The President is informed, in a cablegram from Mr. Day, Noven]- 
ber 3, that " the majority of the commission are clearly of the opinion 
that our demand for the Philippine Islands can not be based on 
conquest." 

36. 

The President, on November 3, answers Mr. Day, declaring that 
' ' the destruction of the Spanish fleet on May 1 was the conquest of 
Manila, the capital of the Philippines," and assuming that the com- 
missioners had not yielded the claim to the whole archipelago "b}^ 
right of conquest." 

* 37. 

Commissioners at Paris, on November 1, again inform the President 
that the conquest claim is not valid or sound. 

38. 

The President, on November 5, accepts the peace commissioners^ 
judgment in this matter. 

39. 

The Spanish commissioners, on November 28, 1898, accept Ameri- 
can terms and agree to cede the Philippine Archipelago in consideration 
of the payment of $20,000,000 by the United States. 

[Note. — This transaction was afterwards described by Judge Day. 
chairman of the American commission, as a "purchase." (See his 
letter to D. K. Watson, of Columbus, Ohio, in October, 1899.)] 

40. 

Treaty of peace signed in Paris, December 10, 1898. 



HISTORY OF THE PHILIPPHSTE POLTCY. 13 

41. 

Agoncillo, agent of the Filipino government in Pari.s, publishes a 
protest against the treaty, December 12, because it fails to I'ecognize 
the independence of the Filipino nation. 

42. 

The President, in his message to Congress December 5, 1898, again 
advances the claim that the Philippine Archipelago had been conquered. 
Describing the operations, he writes: 

The last scene of the war was enacted at Manila, its starting place. On August 13, 
after a brief assault upon the works by the land forces, * * * the capital sur- 
rendered unconditionally. * * * By this, the conquest of the Philippine Islands 
* * * was formally sealed. 

43. 

The President, on December 21, 1898, issues an order to General 
Otis directing him to extend, "with all possible dispatch," to the whole 
archipelago "the military government heretofore maintained by the 
United States in the city, harbor, and bay of Manila." He begins 
this order as follows: 

The destruction of the Spanish fleet in the harbor of Manila by the United States 
naval squadron commanded by Rear-Admiral Dewey, followed by the reduction of 
the city and the surrender of the Spanish forces, practically effected the conquest 
of the Philippine Islands and the suspension of Spanish sovereignty therein. 

[Note. — The President's reassertion of the right to the Philippines 
by conquest in his annual message of December 5, and his order to 
Otis of December 21, took place within a few weeks after his treat}' 
commissioners at Paris had notified him that the conquest claim was 
not valid and after he himself had yielded to their view, so far as fram- 
ing the treat}^ was concerned. Now, if this extraordinary performance 
by the President be interpreted in the light of all that has gone before, 
dating from the instructions to Dewey in February, 1898, what is the 
reasonable conclusion the student of history must come to ? Surel}', 
he must first conclude that the President had the idea of a conquest of 
the Philippines deeply embedded in his mind, that the idea had been 
planted there sometime before the war with Spain began and that he 
persisted in holding to it even after the theory of conquest as a claim 
to territory had been abandoned by his treaty commissioners. 

The final conclusion must be that the Administration had entertained 
the design of a permanent conquest of the Philippines or a part thereof 
as earh' as the late winter of 1897-98, when the situation in China and 
the situation in Cuba combined to direct the thoughts of statesmen to 
the possibilities of a war between the United States and Spain. This 
conclusion is strengthened, moreover, b}' the haste and prematureness 
of the order to General Otis to extend his territory over the whole 
archipelago. When this order was issued, December 21, 1898, the 
Paris treaty had not been ratified and none of the territory outside of 
Manila and it suburbs was yet in any sense subject to American 
jurisdiction. The order of December 21, therefore, was unlawful and 
a clear usurpation of power by the Executive in order to occup}" with 
his military forces, at the earliest possible moment, territor}^ which 
he claimed on a false basis. It is clear that the Chief Executive's mind 
was saturated with the idea of conquest. 



14 HISTORY OF THE PHILIPPHSTE POLICY. 

44. 

The President on December 23, 1898, orders that United States 
troops be sent to occupy the city of Iloilo in the island of Pana3^ 

45. 

The Spanish General Rios, on December 24, 1898, surrenders Iloilo 
to the armed forces of the Malolos government, which thereupon takes 
possession of the place and maintains law and order. 

46. 

American force, under command of Gen. M. P. Miller, reaches Iloilo 
Harbor on December 28, 1S98. General Miller demands the surrender 

of the city. 

4T. 

The "federal government of the Visayas" refuses, December 30, to 
surrender Iloilo to General Miller. Iloilo merchants petition General 
Miller not to attack. 

48. 

General Otis; on December 29, sends to General Miller, by a British 
cruiser, a copy of the President's proclamation of December 21, order- 
ing the immediate extension of American authorit}^ over the entire 
archipela,go. In a note to General Miller, accompanying the Presi- 
dent's proclamation. General Otis writes: 

You can remain in the harbor with your forces. If you meet with decided or 
strong opposition, await there fui-ther instructions, and, if necessary, I can direct a 
portion of your force to other ports in the southern islands, where you will not meet 
much, if any, opposition. 

[Note. — This proves that General Otis already contemplated execut- 
ing the President's order of December 21 at once by diverting some of 
General Miller's troops to the more southern islands.] 

49. 

General Miller, on Januar}^ 1, 1899, sends a verbatim and true copy 
of the President's proclamation or order of December 21 to the native 
authorities in Iloilo, and, at the same time, asks that they withdraw 
the native army and allow his troops to enter the city. In a letter to 
the native authorities General Miller tells them: 

As indicated in the President's cablegram, under existing conditions, the people of 
Panay Island owe obedience to the political authority of the United States. 

He also directs their attention speciticalh^ to that portion of the 
President's proclamation ordering the extension ''with all possible 
dispatch" of the United States military rule over the whole archi- 
pelago. 

50. 

The native authorities of Iloilo, on January 9, 1899, acknowledged 
the receipt of the verbatim copy of the President's proclamation, but 
refused to surrender the city. 

[Note. — The special historical significance of the Iloilo expedition is 



HISTORY OF THE PHILIPPINE POLICY. 15 

that it actually and plij'sically began the war between the United 
States and Filipinos and marks the United States Government, under 
the personal direction of President McKinley, as the aggressor in that 
war. When General Miller appeared with a strong militar}^ and naval 
force in Iloilo Harbor and demanded the surrender of the city by the 
native authorities, who acknowledged allegiance to the Malolos gov- 
ernment, he committed an act of war upon that government. When 
he sent to the Iloilo authorities the President's order directing the 
immediate extension of American militarj^ rule over the whole archi- 
pelago he gave notice to the native Filipino government of what was 
unequivocally an act of war by the President of the United States. 
We only need to appl^y these facts to other conditions to understand 
their true import. If the Emperor of Germany should order his gen- 
erals to extend German authority over France "with all possible 
dispatch," the French would be justified in regarding the order as a 
declaration of war. ' 

There has been considerable controversy as to whether President 
Kreuger, of the South African Republic, was justified in issuing his 
ultimatum to the British Government. No human being would con- 
tend that Mr. Kreuger would not have been justified in regarding as 
the first act of an invasion, and, therefore, as an act of war, an order 
by the British Government directing its general in South Africa to 
extend at once British authority over the Transvaal. In the Philip- 
pines, in addition to such an order, there was a formal demand b}^ an 
American general, commanding a military and naval force, for the 
surrender of a city occupied hj the native government. These acts 
by the President of the United States and an American general were 
committed at a time when the United States had no shadow of legal 
jurisdiction over any part of the Philippines, outside of Manila Bay, 
the citj^ of Manila and its suburbs, as was afterwards admitted by the 
President, McKinley himself, in a speech at Pittsburg, Pa., August 
28, 1899, when he said: 

Until the treaty was ratified we had no authority beyond Manila, city, bay, and 
harbor. 

Now, the treaty did not pass the United States Senate until February 
6, 1899, a full month after General Miller's demand for the surrender 
of Iloilo, and the ratifications were not exchajiged between Spain and 
the United States, the act which alone gave any legal force to the 
treaty, until April 11, 1899. So far as the Filipino people and their 
government de facto were concerned, the proclamation of December 
21, 1898, and General Miller's demand for the surrender of Iloilo were 
acts of aggression — acts of war — notwithstanding that the Malolos 
government had not been ofiicially recognized by any of the powers 
and had no acknowledged international standing. The fact that actual 
bloodshed did not begin until Februarj^ 4. 1899, in no wise invalidates 
the fact that ar^ aggressive war was begun by the United States 
Government a full month at least before that date.] 

51. 

General Otis, on January 4, 1899, issues the President's proclama- 
tion of December 21, in a new form, revised by himself, so as to omit 
the passages most offensive to the feelings of the Filipino people. 

[Note. — This step on General Otis's part was unavailing, first, 
because even in the amended form the proclamation indicated the 



16 HISTORY OF THE PHILIPPINE POLICY. 

immediate assumption b}' the United States of full authorit}' over the 
whole archipelago; second, because the literal version had already been 
published broadcast by General Miller in Iloilo, whence it was com- 
municated to the headquarters of the native government at Malolos, 
the telegraph lines of the archipelago being at that time under the 
control of the natives.] 

5i3. 

Aguinaldo, on January 5, 1899, issues a counter proclamation and 
protest. 

[Note. — Aguinaldo, in issuing this proclamation, was cognizant of 
the acts of war that had alread}'^ Ijeen committed by the United States 
Government, for he said: 

My governnaent can not remain indifferent in view of such a violent and aggressive 
seizure of a portion of its territory.] 

.53. 

General Otis, on Januar}'^ 9, 1899, appoints a commission of army 
officers, General Hughes, Colonel Smith, and Lieutenant-Colonel 
Crowder, to meet a commission of three appointed b}" Aguinaldo, in 
conformity with Aguinaldo's request "to confer with regard to the 
situation of affairs." 

[Note. — Nothing came of this joint commission's meeting. General 
Otis, in his official report of August 31, 1899, said: 

They (Filipino commissioners) beg for some tangible concession from the United 
States Government — one which they could present to the people and which might 
serve to allay the excitement. Nothing could be accomplished without the sacrifice 
of some of the attributes of sovereignty (by the United States), and certainly that 
could not be done by any existing authority. 

General Otis added: 

Finally the conference became the object of insurgent suspicion. 

That was true. On Januar}^ IT, 1899, the Independencia, the organ 
of the Malolos governuient, printed an editorial in which the following 
appeared: 

The Filipinos are disillusioned, and believe that the appointment of this commis- 
sion is for nothing more than to <rain time and allow the arrival of more forces (from 
the United States).] 

54. 

Fio-hting between the American and Filipino armies begins around 
Mifniia February 1, 1899, continuing Februarv 5. Filipinos defeated 
and driven back after suffering ver}^ severe losses. General Otis 
reported: 

Their loss was estimated at 3,000, and, considering the number who died upon the 
field of battle, might be deemed conservative. 

[Note. — General Aguinaldo was in Malolos, IS miles away, when 
the battle of Manila took place, and it is conceded on'all side.s that no 
attack on the American lines that night had been ordered by Aguinaldo 
or any of his generals. General O'tis, in his official report, said: 

It is not believed that the chief insurgent leaders wished to open hostilities at this 
time, as they were not completely prepared to assume the initiative. 

The armed collision on the night of February 4 was clearly unpre- 
meditated. A Filipino, trespassing on territory then held by the 



HISTORY OF THE PHILIPPHSTE POLICY. 17 

American arni}^, was shot and killed by an American sentry, Private 
Grayson, of the Nebraska Volunteers. From this "first shot" further 
fighting- developed between the outposts of the two confronting 
armies, until after about one hour and a half the engagement became 
general along the whole line. There was no deliberate "attack" by 
either army; the situation had become so strained, however, since the 
acts of war committed by the President of the United States in his 
proclamation of December 21, and b}^ General Miller in demanding 
the surrender of lloilo, that a general battle was easily precipitated 
when the collision at the Nebraska outpost occurred. It is altogether 
probable that the generals on both sides had prepared plans of attack 
for some future date, since, under the circumstances prevailing, the 
preparation of such plans was simplj^ a part of the professional busi- 
ness of a general in command. Especially natural would it have been 
for Aguinaldo to have prepai'ed plans of attack on Manila, since acts 
of war had already been committed against his government by the 
Government of the United States. 

On the other hand, General Otis must have attacked the Filipino 
army around Manila whenever he had set out to establish American 
authorit}^ over Luzon. All points concerning "what might have 
been" aside, the essential facts as they took place are as follows: The 
United States Government committed acts of war in the President's 
proclamation of December 21 and the expedition to lloilo, which the 
Filipino government, according to all civilized usage, would have been 
completely justified in treating as the initiation and the declaration of 
war, yet the Filipino government refrained from an}- warlike act in 
reprisal calculated to precipitate actual fighting; and actual fighting 
having accidentally broken out, the Filipino authorities, as is conceded 
b}^ the American general, had wished at least to postpone it until a 
later and more opportune time. It is clear, therefore, that the Filipinos 
did not initiate the war. It is clear, also, that the primary respon- 
sibility for that war is deepl}^ rooted in the policy of conquest which 
has been traced back through the acts of the administration of Presi- 
dent McKinley to a period prior to the war with Spain. The President 
was now face to face w^ith the logical result of his policy, which was a 
prolonged and sanguinary war for the actual conquest of the people 
of the Philippine Archipelago.] 

55. 

Treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, under - hi h 
Spain ceded her rights in the Philippine Archipelago, passes the United- 
States Senate February 6, 1899. 

[Note. — This treaty would not have passed the Senate had not news 
of the battle of Manila reached Washington before the vote was taken. 
The change of two votes would have defeated the treaty, and there 
were two opposition Senators — Jones, of Nevada, and McLaurin, di 
South Carolina — who declared in the Senate that the.y voted aye 
because of the outbreak of hostilities. It was represented at that 
time in this country that the Filipino army had "attacked" the 
American lines.] 

56. 

Battle of Caloocan February 10, Filipinos to the number of about 
4,000 being defeated, with heav}^ losses. 

S. Doc. 375 2 



18 HISTORY OF THE PHILIPPINE POLICY. 

57. 
General Miller bombards Iloilo February 11, and takes the cit}^ 

58. 
The Schurman commission reaches Manila March 4. 

59. 

First northern campaign for the conquest of Luzon, under General 
MacArthur's immediate command, begins March 21. 

00. 

Malolos, Filipino government's first capital, occupied bj' General 
MacArthur March 31. 

61. 

The Schurman commission issues a proclamation to the Filipino peo- 
ple April 1. Recites the American claim to full sovereignty over the 
archipelago and the American purposes. 

62. 

General Lawton captures Santa Cruz of La Laguna Province April 10. 

63. 

General Lawton captures San Isidro, 65 miles north of Manila, 
May 17. 

[Note. — General Lawton abandoned both Santa Cruz and San Isidro 
soon after occup3dng" them.] 

64. 

Filipinos attack MacArthur's line at San Fernando, whither he had 
advanced from Malolo^, but are repulsed, with heavy loss, May 21. 

[Note. — While MacArthur held his advanced position at San Fer- 
nando, Lawton was ordered to retreat, and thus Lawton's turning 
movement proved unsuccessful.] 

65. 

Lawton, June 2, starts on an expedition to the east and takes the 
towns of Morong and Antipolo. 

[Note. — Not much of this territory was held long as the result of 
this expedition.] 

66. 

Lawton, June Y, ordered to move south from Manila with about 
1,000 men. He takes Calamba and Los Banos on Laguna Bay and 
occupies the territorj^ south as far as Imus. 

67. 

Filipinos attack MacArthur again, June 15, at San Fernando, and 
are again defeated. 

[Note. — The rainy season had now begun and there was no further 
campaigning of consequence by the American army until the autumn.] 



HISTORY OF THE PHILIPPINE POLICY. 19 



Treaty with the Sultan of Jolo, commonly known as the Sultan of 
the Sulu Islands, negotiated by General Bates and signed on August 
20, 1899. 

[Note. — This treaty recognized slavery in the Sulu Islands and 
stipulated that the Sultan and his chief subordinates should be paid 
monthly pensions or salaries by the United States.] 

69. 

Second northern campaign by American forces begins in October, 
1899. MaoArthur marches up the railroad October 22. 

[Note. — ^The general plan of this campaign was as follows: Mac- 
Arthur to move north to Dagupan, Lawton to go east to San Jose, 
Young to proceed from San Jose to the northwest, and Wheaton, com- 
ing down from the northern seacoast at San Fabian, to effect a junction 
with Young. Thus the Filipino army, with its leaders, was to be 
hemmed in and the war ended. The campaign, while well conceived, 
did not succeed in ending the war, because, owing to rains and trans- 
portation difficulties, the enveloping movements could not be accom- 
plished in time to prevent the Filipinos in arms from escaping east and 
still farther north into the mountains.] 

70. 

MacArthur's troops captured Tarlac, Filipino capital, November 12, 
1899. 

71. 

Filipino leaders hold a council of war November 13, at Bayambang, 
and decide to disband the organized army, which was "incapable of 
further resistance in the field," and resort to guerrilla warfare. 

72. * 

General MacArthur enters Bayambang, last capital of the Filipino 
g'overnment, November 19. 

[Note. — The Filipino government was now entirely disrupted except 
in so far as Aguinaldo, who remained in the field for over a j^ear there- 
after, directed the guerrilla warfare.] 

73. 

General Lawton killed December 18, 1899, south of Manila, on the 
first day of an expedition to strike Filipino forces in the southern 
provinces of Luzon. 

74. 

Engagement at Cavite Viejo January 7, 1900. Native force anni- 
hilated. 

75. 

General Otis is succeeded as militar\^ governor and commander of 
the American Army by General MacArthur May 5, 1900. 



20 HISTOEY OF THE PHILIPPINE POLICY. 

76. 

Expedition under Major March starts from Manila to run down 
Aguinaldo May 6, 1900. 

[Note. — This expedition was unsuccessful.] 

77. 

The Taft Commission arrives in Manila June 3, 190O. 

78. 

General MacArthur issues a proclamation of amnesty June 21, 1900, 
to all who renounce the Filipino aspiration for nationalit}" and accept 
American sovereignty. 

[Note. — Throughout the summer and autumn of 1900 guerrilla war- 
fare continued. After the reelection of President McKinley, in 
November, 1900, there was a marked revival of the guerrilla warfare, 
and a complete failure of the prediction of the Taft Commission that 
war would end sixty da3^s after McKinley's reelection.] 

79. 

The federal party, organized under inspiration of the Taft Com- 
mission and composed of natives disposed to be reconciled to American 
authorit}'^, issues a manifesto to the Filipino people December 2.5, 1900. 

80. 

General Delgado, Filipino leader in Panav, surrenders Januar^^ 11,. 
1901. 

81. 

The Spooner amendment, so called, conferring upon the President 
substantially absolute power to govern the Philippines and other 
islands, passes the United States Congress in Februarj", 1901, and 
becomes a law by Mafch 3, 1901. 



Capture of Aguinaldo through methods not sanctioned by the laws 
of war, March 23, 1901, by General Funston. 

83. 

Aguinaldo takes the oath of allegiance to the United States April 2,. 
and on April 19 there is issued an address signed by him advising his 
compatriots in the struggle for Filipino nationality and independence 
to accept American rule. 

84. 

General MacArthur is succeeded by General Chaffee as military 
governor and commander of the American army on July 1, 1901, and 
Judge Taft on the same date assumes the office of civil governor of 
the archipelago under the authority of the Secretar}" of War. 

Note. — General MacArthur, in his last annual report, dated Jul}^ 4, 
1901, pronounced the military conquest of the Philippine Archipelago 
substantially complete. He said in a kind of retrospect: 

The presence of America in these islands is simply one of the results, in logical 
sequence, of great material prosperity. 



HISTORY OF THE PHILIPPUSTE POLICY. 21 

That is to say, their acquisition was due to commercial and not to 
humanitarian or accidental or providential causes. The acquisition of 
the islands was a deliberate conquest, having its conception in the 
commercial phases of the Chinese situation of 1897-98. And .that it 
was purely a military conquest, which trampled upon the aspirations 
and sentiments of the bulk of the Filipino people, even as the extinc- 
tion of Poland and the destruction of the South African Republics 
violated the dearest traditions of nationality held by the inhabitants of 
those unhappy countries — that point is clearly conceded in another 
passage of the same MacArthur report; for, after reviewing the 
militarj^ situation in the Philippines on July 4, 1901, General Mac- 
Arthur said: 

It is respectfully submitted that the very gratifying conditions herein briefly recapit- 
ulated have not been brought about entirely by the hand of Providence, neither must 
the attitude of the jjeople who have declared for peace, or even that of the leaders of 
the Federal party, be attributed entirely to unreserved pro-Americanism. It would, 
therefore, be unsafe to assume these conservative forces as constant factors, the friendly 
operation of which can be relied upon, irrespective of external influences. * * * 
The holding force in the islands must be a well-organized army and navy. Anything 
in the immediate future calculated to reduce the efficiency of these instruments will 
not only be a menace to the present, but put in jeopardy the entire future of American 
jjossi bill ties in the archipelago, 

() 



/ ^ 



/■ 






j r ^* 



V 

( 



Library OF Congress 
Branch Bindery, 1903 



'■^-f^- ■■'■ ■ 



•s^ 



l;^>4 



LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 




009 784 675 3 












^« 



,, - .^. 



!■■ '< 



1... M,'tL« -M '. . '■:!.-■ 



/ *• ^ 



^■^V(*^.^'■.t 






-.kJI-'-/ 



